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Abstract
A survey of instruction delivery and reinforcement methods in recent laboratory
experiments reveals a wide and inconsistently-reported variety of practices and limited
research evaluating their effectiveness. Thus we experimentally compare how methods
of delivering and reinforcing experiment instructions impact subjects’ comprehension
and retention of payoff-relevant information. We report a one-shot individual decision
task in which non money-maximizing behavior can be unambiguously identified and
find that such behavior is prevalent in our baseline treatment which uses plain, but
relatively standard experimental instructions. We find combinations of reinforcement
methods that can eliminate half of non money-maximizing behavior, and we find that
we can induce a similar reduction via enhancements to the content of instructions.
Residual non money-maximizing behavior suggests this may be an important source of
noise in experimental studies.
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1 Introduction
Experiments start by providing instructions designed to ensure that subjects understand
how their actions and others’ actions determine payoffs. Such understanding is crucial to
the economic interpretation of subjects’ behavior – without it, the experimenter has lost
control (Smith, 1982). Almost from the field’s inception, experimental economists have rec-
ognized that the effectiveness of instructions in establishing understanding may depend on
how they are delivered and reinforced (Fouraker and Siegel 1963). Prominent textbooks give
detailed guidelines on how to deliver instructions and suggest complementary methods to
increase subjects’ comprehension, including reading instructions aloud and using demonstra-
tions, quizzes, and practice rounds (Friedman and Sunder 1994, Davis and Holt 1993, Cassar
and Friedman 2004). Casual observation suggests wide variation in how practitioners deliver
instructions and use reinforcement methods. We review the methods for delivering and re-
inforcing instructions as reported in experimental studies recently published in six leading
journals and confirm this observation. We find that almost all experimenters complement
their instructions with at least one reinforcement method, though the methods used vary
substantially. This suggests that experimental economics lacks clear norms for how instruc-
tions ought to be delivered and reinforced. Troublingly, we were unable to classify roughly
22% of papers because they failed to provide sufficient details on their methods.
Despite observed variation in practices, there is scant evidence comparing their effec-
tiveness. Thus we conduct an experiment to evaluate the impact of methods of delivering
instructions and reinforcing their content on behavior. We study a one-shot timing decision
in which each subject is performing a default Task 1 for money and must decide when (or
whether) to switch over and complete Task 2. Task 2 can be performed at most once, and the
subject is paid the most for doing it at the correct time and least for doing it earlier. More-
over, the subject is better off not doing Task 2 at all than doing it too early. This information
is explicitly stated in the instructions. Doing the task too early – non money-maximizing
behavior (NMB) – could reflect idiosyncratic preferences, or result from a failure to com-
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prehend or retain information from the instructions. Variation in NMB across treatments,
which hold the distribution of preferences constant in expectation, thus reflects variation
in comprehension and retention. For most treatments, we hold constant the content of in-
structions and vary how instructions are delivered and reinforced. We include one additional
treatment with enhanced instructions as a robustness check.
In our first treatment subjects complete self-paced computerized instructions including
practice rounds and then take a comprehension quiz before beginning the study (providing us
an alternative measure of their comprehension upon completion of the instructions). Nearly
half of subjects in this treatment do the task too early, exhibiting NMB. A second treatment
provides subjects with the quiz answers, and this generates a moderate, but statistically
insignificant reduction in NMB. We thus study the additional impact of introducing mone-
tary incentives for quiz performance, of going through the computerized instructions twice
(both before and after the quiz), and of providing paper instructions alongside computerized
instructions. We find that all three of these treatments lead to significant improvements
relative to the baseline – but each only eliminates about half of the observed NMB, as does
our treatment with enhanced instructions.
By studying an individual decision task, our experiment eliminates strategic and other-
regarding motives that might confound the identification or interpretation of NMB. By study-
ing a one-shot decision without feedback, we obtain a clean measure of understanding and
retention of the instructions that is not confounded by learning. We are aware of two exist-
ing papers that have studied the impact of instruction delivery and reinforcement on play
in repeated public goods games (Bigoni and Dragone, 2012; Ramalingam et al., 2018).1 The
more relevant of these is Bigoni and Dragone (2012), who find that shortened on-screen
instructions led to lower quiz scores and longer response times as compared to their baseline
1Our discussion here is restricted to instruction delivery and reinforcement. We have little to say about
how variation in the content of the instructions may affect behavior, by providing or failing to provide
subjects with payoff-relevant information, or alternatively by influencing the framing of the experimental
task. See Alekseev et al. (2017) for a discussion of the use of context in instructions. See also Converse
and Presser (1986) for a discussion of effective survey design which offers potentially useful guidance for
economists.
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paper instructions, shortened paper instructions, and shortened on-screen instructions with
active examples requiring subject input. However, they find no effect of instructions on
observed behavior.
2 Literature Survey
We report how instructions are delivered and reinforced in 260 experimental studies
published between January 2011 and December 2016 in Experimental Economics and five
prominent general interest economics journals. We selected all papers in these journals that
contained at least one lab experiment in which participants were given instructions on the
experimental procedure. For each paper, we checked whether instructions were delivered
on paper, on screen, both, or neither. We also recorded the use of various practices in-
tended to reinforce the content of the instructions, including reading the instructions aloud,
demonstrations, practice rounds, and pre-experiment quizzes. Since ensuring subjects’ ini-
tial comprehension may be particularly important when experiments are one-shot or provide
limited feedback, we further classified the nature of each experiment based on whether or
not a main task was one-shot, and whether or not subjects received feedback. This allows us
to assess whether experimenters adapt their instruction protocols to the nature of the task
being studied. Details of our classification procedure are given in Appendix A. The results
of our survey are given in Table 1.
We were unable to determine how instructions were delivered in 22% of the studies we
reviewed. If behavior is sensitive to how instructions are delivered, this oversight hampers
replication. Of the remaining 204 studies, 61% deliver instructions exclusively on paper, 24%
deliver instructions exclusively on screen, while another 5% use both. We find this notewor-
thy since the majority of these experiments are themselves computerized. The remaining
10% of these 204 studies use neither paper nor computer instructions. Most such studies
























































































































































































































































































































orally along with some of the reinforcement methods discussed below. We suspect that ex-
perimental economists’ revealed preference for paper instructions is driven by the fact that
subjects can refer back to them throughout the experiment, which may not always be the
case with computer instructions. This may mitigate subjects’ tendency to forget important
information.2
85% of all studies use at least one method of reinforcement which suggests that ex-
perimenters are almost universally concerned about subject comprehension and retention.
Instructions are read aloud in 54% of studies. We find that 57% of studies use demonstra-
tions or practice rounds to reinforce subject understanding of the experiment. Examples of
such practices include physical demonstrations of how risk will be resolved,3 guided exam-
ples of possible actions and their consequent outcomes, and unpaid practice rounds. Of the
studies that use at least one of these forms of reinforcement, 80% use guided demonstrations
or guided practice rounds, and 42% use unguided practice rounds; some studies use both.
In addition to reinforcing the content of instructions, experiments can also test subjects’
comprehension thereof with pre-experiment quizzes (39% of studies). At least 63% of these
reinforced understandings and corrected misunderstandings by providing answers to the quiz,
and 41% required a perfect score to commence the experiment. Only three of the studies
paid subjects for quiz performance. We note that 35% of studies that used a quiz did not
clearly report whether or how subjects were given feedback on the quiz.
Given our prior that reinforcement may be especially important when feedback is lim-
ited, we find it surprising that one-shot experiments less frequently incorporate practice or
demonstrations (⇢ =  .19, p < .01, n = 260) and quizzes (⇢ =  .15, p = .02, n = 260) in
their instructions; see Appendix A for more detail.
Our survey reveals wide variation in how experimenters deliver and reinforce instructions.
Nevertheless, there are commonalities which seem to reflect some notion of ‘best practices.’
2Reading instructions aloud and/or publicly distributing paper instructions may also help establish com-
mon information in strategic settings (Friedman and Sunder 1994, p. 77).
3Davis and Holt (1993, p. 23) and Friedman and Sunder (1994 p. 67) suggest that the use of physical
randomization devices may enhance credibility.
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Few studies have tested whether current practices are effective – our experiment is designed
to fill this gap.
3 Experimental Design
3.1 Overview of Experiment
We design a one-shot, individual choice experiment in which each subject performs two tasks,
a base task which provides a low flow of payoffs throughout the experiment, and a second
task which can only be completed once and results in a potentially large lump-sum payoff.
The amount of the lump sum depends on the time at which they initiate the second task.
Doing the second task too early results in a lower payoff than doing it at the right time (or
not doing it at all).
Task 1 is the Poodle Jump game (based on a popular mobile game Doodle Jump), where
players guide a bouncing poodle up a series of platforms by pressing two buttons. When
a subject misses a platform, the poodle falls to the ground and the game restarts with
no penalty. Each participant receives $0.25 per period of Task 1, so long as they jump a
minimum cumulative height. This height was chosen so that it would be trivially easy to
complete but not automatic – effectively guaranteeing an attentive subject this payment
each period.4
Task 2 is a simplified version of the slider task (Gill and Prowse, 2012). Players can
switch from Task 1 to Task 2 at any time by pressing the ‘j’ key, but they can only do this
once. In the slider task, players are presented with four sliders which can be moved from
zero to 100. The task is successfully completed when all four sliders are dragged to 50 and
the player clicks “Continue.”5 Task 2’s payoff depends on when the subject presses ‘j’. For
the first 21 periods, each period being one minute long, it pays $0.20. However, in period 22
it jumps to $7, falling to $4 in period 23, then dropping by $0.50 in every period thereafter
4Only 5 out of 308 subjects ever failed to attain the required height in a period; 4 did so once and one
subject did so twice. These failures account for only 0.1% of all Poodle Jump periods.
5Only one subject started but failed to complete the slider task.
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until period 30 when the experiment ends. These payoffs are demonstrated in Figure 1.
Doing Task 2 in period 22 maximizes a subject’s payoff; whereas, doing it before period 22
minimizes a subject’s payoff. If a subject fails to do Task 2 in period 22, they would always
earn higher payoffs by doing it as soon as possible thereafter.
The challenge for subjects is to recognize and remember the correct time to press the
‘j’ key to complete Task 2, given the attention required to successfully complete Task 1
in each period. However, subjects have strong incentive to complete Task 2 at the right
time: doing Task 2 at the right time raises payoffs by $6.75 relative to not doing it at all,
and by a minimum of $3 compared to completing it at any other time. Moreover, doing it
before period 22 leads the subject to forgo the opportunity to do it at the optimal period or
thereafter, and also results in a lower payoff than never doing Task 2. Thus, doing Task 2
before period 22 precludes the subject from maximizing their monetary payoffs. We use the
NMB acronym to refer to such behavior below.
NMB can thus reveal that a subject failed to comprehend or retain a particularly key
piece of payoff-relevant information from the instructions.6 As hinted at earlier, our design
restricts the set of possible preference-based explanations for NMB. Moreover, since we
sample subjects from the same distribution of preferences in each treatment, variation in
NMB across treatments identifies changes in comprehension and retention.
3.2 Treatment Design
We employ a between-subjects design with seven treatments. We study the effectiveness
of different ways of delivering and reinforcing the experiment’s instructions on NMB using
our aforementioned measure. Many experimenters implicitly assume that subjects fully
understand their instructions. If this is true, we should not observe any difference between
treatments. However, if subjects do not always comprehend or retain information from the
6We note that neither a subject who understood and retained this information but simply forgot to switch
nor a subject who (for whatever reason) did not understand this information but only switched at or after
period 22 would be coded as exhibiting NMB by this measure.
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Figure 1: Screenshot showing how payoffs were described to subjects
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Table 2: Summary of treatments
Treatment Quiz Answers Additional Reinforcement # ofSubjects
NO QUIZ No No No 43
QUIZ Yes No No 76
ANSWERS Yes Yes No 36
INCENTIVE Yes Yes Pay 0.50 CAD per correct quiz answer 38
TWICE Yes Yes Instructions restarted unexpectedly 38
PAPER Yes Yes Instructions duplicated in paper printout 40
ENHANCED Yes No Only through enhanced on-screen instructions 37
instructions there is the potential for variation in delivery and additional reinforcement to
reduce NMB. Our treatments test the impact of various more-or-less standard procedures
employed by experimenters to improve comprehension and retention. All treatments are
summarized in Table 2. All treatments started with a common set of self-paced on-screen
instructions, which included a graphical explanation of payoffs as well as reinforcement from
practice rounds for both tasks and practice switching between tasks.
The NO QUIZ treatment presents the instructions on screen with no additional rein-
forcement. The NO QUIZ treatment gives us information on NMB when subjects read
instructions on their own.
The QUIZ treatment was identical to the NO QUIZ except that each subject completed
a six question comprehension quiz on paper at the end of the on-screen instructions; subjects
were informed that there would be a quiz prior to beginning the instructions, but no feedback
was given on the quiz. The QUIZ treatment allows us to assess whether the presence of the
quiz affects NMB, and the quiz itself gives a secondary measure of comprehension. When
we analyze our data, we use this as our baseline treatment for comparison to the other
treatments below.
The ANSWERS treatment was identical to the QUIZ treatment, except that subjects
were presented the answers to the quiz orally after all had completed it. This corrected
possible misunderstandings revealed in quiz answers and reinforced key pieces of information
from the instructions. As noted by Cassar and Friedman (2004), a quiz is a good way to
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“make sure that the subjects understand the rules” (p. 71); thus we expect providing the
answers to the quiz will correct failures of comprehension or retention and reduce NMB.
The TWICE treatment was identical to the ANSWERS treatment except that after
completing the quiz and answers, the experimenter unexpectedly restarted the instructions
for the participants to work through a second time. This allowed subjects to further review
any content they missed on the first go and provided additional reinforcement. As noted by
Friedman and Sunder (1994), “[when] a subject does not seem to understand the instructions
[...] the experimenter may reread the relevant part of the instructions or go through an
example” (p. 77). Repeating the instructions TWICE achieves both of these objectives and
thus should reduce NMB.
The INCENTIVE treatment was identical to the ANSWERS treatment except that sub-
jects were paid $0.50 for each correct quiz answer, and were informed of this before starting
the instructions. We hypothesized that this would lead subjects to pay more attention to
the material in the instructions, and make any mistakes from the quiz more salient, thereby
improving understanding. Pay for performance is standard in experimental economics be-
cause economists believe it motivates subjects to think carefully and participate actively
in experiments (Hertwig and Ortmann, 2001). By paying for performance on the quiz, we
anticipate that subjects will exert more effort in carefully reading the instructions, thereby
reducing NMB.
The PAPER treatment was identical to the ANSWERS treatment except that the ex-
perimenter also distributed paper printouts of the instructions (in addition to the on-screen
instructions), which participants could keep and reference at any time, even while completing
the quiz.7 We thus expect PAPER to improve comprehension as measured by quiz scores
and reduce NMB both for this reason, and through improving retention given the quiz score
since written instructions are available throughout the session.
The ENHANCED treatment was identical to the QUIZ treatment but with enhanced
7The PAPER treatment potentially reduces forgetfulness since all relevant information is accessible
throughout the experiment.
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on-screen instructions.8 Compared to the other treatments, the on-screen instructions were
lengthened from five to seven screens in length. In these enhanced instructions, Figure 1
appeared four times (instead of only once), and subjects were presented with four worked-out
examples that explained the payoff that would result from different possible switching times.
Unlike in our other treatments, the last page of the enhanced instructions included Figure
1, and each subject waited on that page while other subjects completed the instructions and
while they completed the quiz. With the benefit of hindsight, we emphasized the details we
knew past subjects had failed to grasp. This treatment is also consistent with the advice
of Friedman and Sunder (1994), applied between-subjects, and we expect the ENHANCED
instructions to similarly reduce NMB.
For reasons explained above, we hypothesize that each additional form of reinforcement
reduces NMB. Specifically, we conjectured that having a QUIZ would have a similar level
of NMB as NO QUIZ, but relative to these treatments, ANSWERS would reduce NMB,
each of our remaining interventions on top of that (INCENTIVE, TWICE, and PAPER)
would further reduce NMB, and ENHANCED would also reduce NMB relative to QUIZ. We
hypothesized that higher quiz scores will be associated with lower rates of NMB, and that in
the INCENTIVE, PAPER, and ENHANCED treatments most or all reductions in NMB are
reflected in higher quiz scores, while the ANSWERS and TWICE treatments reduce NMB
given quiz scores.
Our experiment differs from existing studies on instructions in two regards. First, this
is an individual decision task, so there is neither complexity from strategic behavior nor
other-regarding concerns. Second, it is a one-shot task – each subject can only press ‘j’
once – so participants who fail to understand the instructions cannot learn through trial
and error. These features allow us to cleanly identify NMB and attribute variation in NMB
to variation in the delivery and reinforcement of instructions. Nonetheless, we believe that
our experiment provides a good analogy to other experiments, particularly those where a
8The ENHANCED treatment was added later on a suggestion from the editor.
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decision of interest is only one of multiple decisions the subject makes. We also conjecture
that more complicated experiments face at least as much risk of misunderstanding as exists
in our simple experiment (even if most existing experiments are unable to diagnose it).
3.3 Procedures
Upon entering the lab, the experimenter assigned participants to visually isolated computer
terminals. Participants were told not to interact with one another for the duration of the
experiment. In all treatments, participants were informed that they would be given a set
of instructions followed by an experiment in which they could potentially earn a significant
amount of money; in the treatments with a quiz, they were also informed that there would be
a quiz at the end of the instructions; subjects in the INCENTIVE treatment were informed
that they would be paid for their quiz performance above and beyond their earnings from
the experiment. The experimenter then started the self-paced on-screen instructions which
included a written description of the tasks and the payoff structure, practice rounds of
both tasks, practice switching between tasks, and a graphical illustration of the payoffs to
both tasks in each period (a full copy of the instructions are presented in Appendix B).
Once all participants completed the instructions, the experimenter distributed the quiz in
the QUIZ, ANSWERS, INCENTIVE, TWICE, PAPER, and ENHANCED treatments; the
correct answers were revealed after all participants had completed the quiz except in the
QUIZ and ENHANCED treatments. In the TWICE treatment, subjects completed the on-
screen instructions a second time, including practice rounds. Then the experiment started.
At the end of some sessions, we conducted a post-experiment questionnaire (Appendix D).9
We recruited 308 participants to 45 sessions through Simon Fraser University’s CRABE
recruiting system, with no subject participating in more than one session. Each session lasted
under an hour. Average earnings were 18.37 CAD including a 7 CAD show-up payment. We
collected no other demographic data nor other behavioral measures.
9We have responses from 72 subjects because this was added at the suggestion of a referee.
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4 Results
We use a subject’s decision to do Task 2 at any time before period 22 as NMB, which is
our behavioral measure of their failure to pay attention to, comprehend, absorb, or retain
information from the instructions. Table 3 shows the share of NMB by treatment. All
p-values reported below are two-sided.
Finding 1: NMB is prevalent.
In our NO QUIZ and QUIZ treatments, 44% and 47% of subjects exhibited NMB by do-
ing Task 2 before period 22. This is despite the fact that these treatments include both
demonstrations and practice periods. Even in our most effective treatment, the correspond-
ing share is 18%. These findings suggest that failures to comprehend or retain information
from instructions may be an important source of noise.10 This justifies concern about the
effectiveness of instruction delivery and reinforcement methods.
Finding 2: Combining reinforcement methods reduces NMB.
We find that additional reinforcement reduces NMB: we reject the joint hypothesis that
NMB occurs at the same rate across all treatments (Fisher’s exact test, p < .01, n = 308).
Compared to NO QUIZ and QUIZ, we observe somewhat less NMB in the ANSWERS
treatment (33%), but we do not detect any statistically significant differences between these
treatments (Fisher’s exact test of equal NMB rates across these treatments, p = .35, n =155).
In each of the INCENTIVE (24%), TWICE (18%), and PAPER (23%) treatments that
provide additional reinforcement, subjects exhibited significantly less NMB than in the QUIZ
treatment (Fisher’s exact tests, p < .02, .01, .01, n = 114, 114, 116 respectively). While the
ENHANCED treatment (22%) reduces NMB (Fisher’s exact test, p = .01, n = 113), it
does not eliminate it.11 Our findings suggest that more detailed instructions and extensive
10In Appendix C, we show that we find similar results if we account for trembles by defining NMB based
on doing Task 2 before period 21.
11We cannot reject the hypothesis INCENTIVE, TWICE, PAPER, and ENHANCED lead to similar


























































































































































































































































































reinforcement each improve comprehension and retention of the instructions.
Finding 3: Lower quiz scores are associated with NMB. Providing quiz answers
while also making incorrect answers salient can reduce NMB among lower per-
formers.
Quiz scores provide an alternative measure of subject comprehension immediately after the
instructions. In the QUIZ treatment which provides neither feedback nor additional re-
inforcement, quiz score and NMB are negatively related (Goodman-Kruskal  , p < 0.01,
n = 76); indeed 13 of 76 subjects had a perfect score on the quiz, and none of them subse-
quently exhibited NMB in the experiment. In fact, across all of our treatments we find it
striking that only one of the 73 people with a perfect quiz score exhibited NMB.12 This indi-
cates that full comprehension at the completion of the instructions appears to be a sufficient
condition for avoiding NMB in our experiment and that retention is a second-order issue.
Our quiz score data enable us to test whether the INCENTIVE, PAPER, and EN-
HANCED treatments improved subjects’ comprehension as demonstrated on the quiz, com-
pared to the pooled distribution of quiz scores from the QUIZ, ANSWERS, and TWICE
treatments, which followed identical procedures up to the collection of the quiz.13 Average
quiz scores by treatment are reported in Table 3. To our surprise, neither the INCEN-
TIVE nor the ENHANCED treatment significantly improved quiz scores (rank-sum tests,
p = .59, .14, n = 188, 187, respectively). The PAPER treatment, which made the answers
accessible to subjects during the quiz, improved scores significantly (rank-sum test, p < 0.01,
n = 190), and the linear regression in Table 4, column 3 shows that PAPER had the largest
effect on quiz score of all of our treatments.14
Quiz score data also allow us to further assess how our treatments reduce NMB.
12One person with a perfect quiz score in the TWICE treatment switched 28 seconds too early.
13We find no significant differences in the distribution of quiz scores in the QUIZ, ANSWER, and TWICE
treatments (Kruskal-Wallis test, p = .15, n = 150).
14The positive effect of paper instructions on quiz performance is consistent with the evidence reported in
Bigoni and Dragone (2012).
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Table 4: Treatment effects on Non Money-maximizing Behavior and Quiz Scores
Dependent variable Mediation analysis
NMB Quiz Score NMB
(1) (2) (3) (4)
NO QUIZ -0.128 n
(-0.889, 0.632)
ANSWERS -0.588 0.051 -0.050 -0.138
112(-1.424, 0.248) (-2.884, 2.987) (-0.586, 0.487) (-0.308, 0.048)ANSWERS ⇥ Quiz Score -0.206 0.00715
(-0.941, 0.528) (-0.069, 0.085)
INCENTIVE -1.065** -2.531* 0.211 -0.219
114(-1.948, -0.182) (-5.332, 0.271) (-0.354, 0.775) (-0.392, -0.030)INCENTIVE ⇥ Quiz Score 0.361 -0.028
(-0.257, 0.978) (-0.111, 0.049)
TWICE -1.383*** -2.181 0.421 -0.255***
114(-2.329, -0.436) (-5.235, 0.873) (-0.156, 0.998) (-0.425, -0.065)TWICE ⇥ Quiz Score 0.207 -0.057
(-0.467, 0.880) (-0.145, 0.021)
PAPER -1.131** 7.334* 1.320*** 0.134
116(-2.009, -0.253) (-0.810, 15.478) (0.922, 1.718) (-0.189, 0.343)PAPER ⇥ Quiz Score -1.485* -0.177***
(-2.970, 0.001) (-0.273, -0.085)
ENHANCED -1.182** -0.557 0.489* -0.188*
113(-2.096, -0.269) (-4.596, 3.482) (-0.030, 1.008) (-0.382, 0.013)ENHANCED ⇥ Quiz Score -0.116 -0.067*
(-0.993, 0.760) (-0.151, 0.004)
Quiz Score -0.679***
(-1.053, -0.306)
Intercept -0.105 2.683*** 4.105***
(-0.561, 0.350) (0.993, 4.374) (3.789, 4.422)
Observations 308 265 265
QUIZ is the omitted category. *, **, and *** respectively denote p < .1, p < .05, p < .01. Robust (HC1) 95%
confidence intervals are in parentheses in Columns (1)-(4). Mediation column reports estimated “direct effects” in
the row of a treatment dummy, and mediated effects in the row of the interaction term between Quiz Score and that
treatment dummy, both evaluated relative to the QUIZ baseline. That is, the direct effect of a treatment corresponds
to E[NMB|Treatment,Quiz Score = 4.1]  E[NMB|QUIZ,Quiz Score = 4.1], while the mediated effect
corresponds to E[NMB|QUIZ,Quiz Score = E[Quiz Score|Treatment]]  E[NMB|QUIZ,Quiz Score = 4.1].
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Goodman-Kruskal   tests revealed that quiz score had a significant (p < .05 in each test,
n = 76, 36, 38, 40, 37 respectively for each of QUIZ, ANSWERS, TWICE, PAPER, and EN-
HANCED) negative relationship with NMB in each treatment except INCENTIVE (where
p = .054, n = 38) and NO QUIZ (where scores were not available). To decompose the extent
to which treatment effects operate via (i.e. are mediated through) improved comprehension
demonstrated on the quiz, we perform mediation analysis (applying the approach of Imai
et al. 2010) in column 4 of Table 4, based on a model of NMB as a logistic-linear function
of quiz score, treatment, and their interactions (column 2), and a linear regression to model
treatment effects on quiz scores (column 3). The INCENTIVE and TWICE treatments have
sizable and significant direct effects but insignificant and small mediated effects.15 This in-
dicates that these treatments primarily reduce NMB by clearing up (TWICE) and making
salient (INCENTIVE) failures of comprehension demonstrated on the quiz. In contrast, the
PAPER treatment has the largest mediated effect of all treatments, which is statistically
significant, but only a small and insignificant direct effect beyond that. Mediated and direct
effects of the ENHANCED treatment are each borderline insignificant, indicating a mix of
both types of effects, but point estimates indicate a larger direct effect.
Robustness Checks Figure 2 shows empirical CDFs of completion times for Task 2, by
treatment. For robustness, we show in Appendix C that we would arrive at similar qualitative
conclusions to those reported in Table 4 using any of three alternative measures of NMB
which vary the strictness of the criteria by which we classify behavior as NMB.
Our post-experiment questionnaire was only partially able to diagnose causes of NMB in
our experiment (see Appendix D for a full analysis). While subjects’ responses are correlated
with behavior and quiz scores, they fail to provide any indication of the differences between
the QUIZ and ENHANCED treatments in NMB revealed in the experiment.
15In the case of TWICE, this is reassuring since any mediated effect can only arise due to sampling
variation.
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Our experiments indicate that even when using combinations of reinforcement methods in-
cluding demonstrations, practice periods, and a quiz, many subjects’ behavior reveals that
they fail to pay attention to, understand, or retain information from the instructions. Com-
bining these with further reinforcement methods reduced NMB, as did increasing the level
of detail in the instructions. Each of these methods leads to a similar improvement but does
not eliminate NMB.
In our setting, we feel confident attributing variation in the anomalous behavior that we
observe to a variation in the failure to understand or absorb the instructions. In other ex-
periments designed to test for anomalous behavior, the distinction between truly anomalous
behavior of interest and a failure to understand the instructions may not be so clearcut.
This justifies a concern with how instructions are given and the use of behavioral checks of
understanding. Our findings broadly suggest that experimenters’ attempts to reinforce the
instructions or make them more salient can be effective at reducing NMB. Note that though
we are able to reduce NMB in our design, some residual NMB persists even in the best case.
While the extent of such NMB is likely to vary with experimental context (e.g. subject
pool, design, feedback), its presence is noteworthy and has implications for the power and
interpretation of experimental tests.
Finally, our findings motivate advice on how to report and deliver instructions. First,
experimenters should be aware that the way instructions are delivered and reinforced has
consequences for behavior. Second, we suggest providing paper instructions when possible,
since this requires no extra lab time, is almost free, and is about as effective in reducing NMB
in our experiment as other reinforcement methods. Third, we suggest that all experimental
papers should clearly report how they deliver and reinforce instructions, as this can be crucial
for close replication and interpretation.16 Journals’ efforts to require experimenters to share
16For example, recent work by Chen et al. (2018) demonstrates, via new experiments following different
instructions protocols, that a recent failed replication attempt arose because of differences in how instructions
were delivered.
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copies of their instructions are laudable, and these could be complemented by standardized
reporting of how instructions are delivered and reinforced.
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Supplementary Appendix to Freeman,
Kimbrough, Petersen, and Tong (2018)
A Review of current practice
Inclusion/Exclusion criteria
We included experimental papers published between January 2011 and December 2016 in
six journals: the American Economic Review, Econometrica, the Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics, the Journal of Political Economy, the Review of Economic Studies, and Experimental
Economics. Articles from the AER: Papers and Proceedings were excluded. In order to be
included, a paper had to include at least one lab experiment. We excluded field experiments
and online experiments that were not conducted in a controlled environment, but we include
“lab-in-the-field” experiments that were conducted in a controlled environment.
To classify each included experiment, we reviewed both the text of each paper and sup-
plementary materials available online through the journal’s website, with the exception of
uncompiled code (e.g. z-Tree code).
Coding Criteria: Delivery
Delivery methods could include paper instructions or computer instructions. Values in the
supplementary table are 1 for yes, 0 for no, 0.5 for uncertain. In some cases, an alterna-
tive delivery method was used; for example, Etang et al. (2011) studied subjects in rural
Cameroon and used purely verbal instructions because many subjects were illiterate.
We code the study as having paper instructions if it is directly stated or clearly implied
that a set of paper instructions were used. Some papers were explicit about their use of
printed instructions, while others required us to infer the existence of paper instructions
1
from other details. For instance, Mittone and Ploner (2011, p. 207) write that "after the
choices are collected, instructions for the beliefs elicitation phase are distributed." Distribu-
tion implies a written set of instructions, though this is not explicitly stated. Sometimes we
inferred the form of instructions from the instructions themselves, for instance in Altmann
et al. (2014), the instructions included screenshots, from which we inferred that they must
have been printed on paper.
We code the study as having computer instructions if it is directly stated or clearly
implied that computerized instructions were used. Sometimes this was explicit, while other
times it had to be inferred. For instance, in papers that included copies of their instructions
online, some instructions told participants to click on something to proceed to the next
screen. This implies that the instructions are computerized, even if it is not explicitly stated
in the text of that paper. Cox and James (2012, Supplement p. 2) end their instructions
by telling their subjects, “When you have finished reading and have asked any questions you
might have, please click Done.”
Many papers are unclear on whether the instructions are given on paper or on computers.
If there was no explicit statement of the form of instructions in the paper itself, and no clear
indication from the instructions where these were available online, the paper was coded as
uncertain.
Coding Criteria: Reinforcement
We coded four different forms of reinforcement.
1. Read aloud. We code an experiment as having read aloud its instructions if it is stated
or clearly implied that the instructions were presented orally. Most often this meant that
the experimenter read the instructions for the participants to hear. Some studies, such as
Aycinena et al. (2014, p. 110), included voice recordings of the instructions, which we coded
as read aloud as indicated by the following quote “They were provided with instructions and
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were also shown a video which read these instructions aloud.”
2. Demonstration or guided practice. We code a paper as including demonstration
or guided practice if we can infer that it used walk-throughs of the experimental interface,
examples, or demonstrations of aspects of the experiment during the instructions phase.
Walk-throughs involve actively-guided practice by the subject. Examples include hypothet-
ical descriptions of potential actions and consequent outcomes. For instance, Brookins and
Ryvkin (2014) give subjects an example of the likelihood of success, conditional on the group
members’ investment. Demonstrations actively highlight one or more aspects of the exper-
iment, for example, throwing a die to show subjects how uncertainty will be resolved as
in Ericson and Fuster (2011). The mere use of graphical or tabular methods to commu-
nicate information, or providing screenshots in paper instructions, was considered neither
demonstration nor guided practice.
3. Unguided practice. If the experiment included one or more unpaid practice rounds
without guidance, we coded this as unguided practice. Sometimes this was explicit in the
body of the paper, while other times it was only indicated in the instructions themselves.
4. Quiz. Quizzes or questionnaires were only included if they occurred after the instruc-
tions and before the experiment. Many experiments include questionnaires to check partici-
pants’ understanding ex post, but these are not counted as they do not reinforce participants’
understanding of the instructions before the experiment.
When a quiz was given, we checked whether feedback was given after the quiz and before
the experiment. If it was clearly stated that subjects were given the correct answers to the
quiz, “Feedback” was coded as a 1. If subjects must get 100% to proceed with the experiment,
we infer that feedback was given. Many papers give quizzes to “ensure comprehension of
instructions” but do not explicitly indicate whether answers were given. For example Cabrera
et al. (2013, p. 432) indicate that “subjects completed a quiz to make sure they had fully
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understood the logic of the game.” It is ambiguous whether this implies that feedback
was given to promote subject understanding ex-ante or instead quiz performance was used
by the experimenters to assess subject comprehension ex-post. Such papers are coded as
uncertain with respect to quiz feedback. We also separately code whether subjects were
paid for correct quiz answers (Incentivized) and whether participants were required to get
all questions correct before continuing (Require 100%).
Coding Criteria: Some main task(s) is (are) one shot
We classified the main task or tasks for each experiment. If at least one of the main tasks is
one shot (that is, subject can be viewed as making a single decision) in one or more of the
treatments, we coded that paper as having a one shot main task under this column. When
researchers use a choice list or the strategy method – where multiple similar decisions are
made almost simultaneously, and could in-principle be viewed as one decision – we view this
task as a one-shot task. In contrast, when decisions are made in a sequence, even without
feedback, we would not consider those to constitute a one-shot task. Anderson et al.’s (2011)
study provides an edge case. In their experiment, each subject plays six public goods games
with different parameter values, but all six choices are presented at the same time. Since
all choices are instances of the same basic task and are presented at once, we coded their
experiment as one shot. If these tasks had been presented sequentially on separate screens,
we would not have coded this as one shot. An interesting boundary case is a dynamic
game with an evolving state variable (e.g. the money supply variable in Petersen and Winn
(2014)); subjects in such games make repeated decisions in the same task, but with different
incentives depending on the state. We have coded these as repeated (i.e. not one shot)
because there is typically feedback between decisions and the state dependence is usually
not so severe that subsequent decisions differ fundamentally from those made in initial round.
The opportunities for learning from repetition thus usually dominate (though not necessarily
always), and we note that we did not explicitly account for this in our coding.
4
Coding Criteria: Some main task(s) has (have) feedback between
decisions
If at least one of the main tasks was repeated with feedback between rounds in one or more
of the treatments, we coded that paper as having a repeated main task with feedback under
this column (e.g. a repeated public goods game in which subjects learned their payoff after
each round (e.g. Bayer et al. (2013)). We considered it sufficient for a subsequent round to
involve choices in the same basic task as the preceding one for which feedback was given. For
example, in Noussair and Stoop (2015), subjects in one treatment completed two dictator
games in a row, with different reward media (money and time) with feedback between them
– we viewed these as repetitions of the same task with feedback.
Coding Criteria: More than one task
We coded whether an experiment has more than one incentivized task. In some cases, an
experiment required subjects to input multiple separate decisions associated with the same
broader task – in these instances, we coded this a single task (as discussed above). Sometimes
a single task has multiple decisions (e.g. a centipede game as in Cox and James (2012) or a
public goods game with punishment as in Harris et al. (2015)). Similarly, in an experiment
that required subjects to vote on a sanctioning scheme that would then be implemented in
a public goods game (Kamei et al., 2015), we viewed the vote and the subsequent game as
one task. Many experiments coded as having more than one task would follow up a main
task with a secondary preference elicitation.
Cross-Check
Each paper was independently coded by two coders, who read each of the 260 papers in
the review along with any instructions available in their online supplementary materials.
For each of the 11 categories coded, both coders marked them as true (=1), false (=0), or
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Table A.1: Correlation between experiment type and delivery and reinforcement
One-shot p-value Feedback between decisions p-value
Paper only .048 .437 .008 .899
Computer only -.011 .863 -.082 .189
Both .018 .770 .022 .722
Neither .157 .011 -.180 .004
Read aloud .112 .072 -.092 .141
Practice/Demonstration -.191 .002 .190 .002
Quiz -.146 .019 .159 .010
Table reports pairwise correlations between delivery/reinforcement
category (rows) and experiment type (columns) and their p-values.
uncertain (=0.5). Both coders agreed most of the time, only disagreeing (including cases
where one coder was uncertain) in 363 out of 11 ⇥ 260 judgments, and only disagreeing
fundamentally (i.e. one coder marking a “0” and the other a “1” on a given paper-category
judgment) in 200 such judgments. The area with the most disagreement was the presence
of demonstration, examples, or guided practice. These are particularly difficult to identify,
as they are often buried in lengthy instructions and the difference between explanation and
demonstration is somewhat subjective. We note that false negatives are more likely than
false positives – it is easy to miss an example or demonstration in instructions but hard to
see one where it doesn’t actually exist. After each person coded independently, both coders
reconciled disagreements to put together the data for Table 1. Typically, when only one
coder was uncertain, disagreement was resolved in favor of the certain coder. In the case of
genuine disagreement coders discussed and settled on the most likely classification.
Correlations amongst practices
One-shot experiments account for about one third of the experiments using computerized
instructions (31%) or paper instructions (35%). 57% of experiments that use neither paper
nor on-screen instructions are one-shot games; most of these studies are field experiments in
which experimenters read instructions aloud or go through the instruction one-on-one with
subjects.
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Table A.2: Instruction practices by feedback
One-shot Feedback between decisions
Total 84 152
Read aloud 52 76
Practice/Demonstration 36 98
Quiz 24 69
We also find that one-shot experiments tend to be less likely to use each of the reinforce-
ment methods (except for reading aloud) – even though such experiments give no feedback,
making each subject’s initial understanding of the instructions crucial. We suspect that this
is because one-shot experiments tend to be simpler and therefore easier to explain. Instruc-
tions are read aloud more often in one-shot game experiments (62%) than in experiments
with feedback between decisions (50%). Other reinforcement methods are used less often
in one-shot experiments than in experiments with feedback between decisions (respectively,
43% versus 65% use some form of practice or demonstration, while 29% versus 45% use a
quiz). These differences result in a significant negative association between one-shot exper-
iments and use of practice/demonstration (⇢ =  .191, p = .002) and quizzes (⇢ =  .146,
p = .019) in the instructions.
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B Experimental Instructions
The experimental sessions all followed the script in Figure B.1.
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Figure B.1: Experimenter’s script for running a session
How to Run a Session 
1. Log in to computer 24 with your SFU email 
2. Log in to students’ computers using username “econ subject” and password “economics” 
(computers 11 and 12 sometimes freeze!) 
3. Open ESILauncher on computer 24 
4. Highlight the machine numbers students are using 
5. Check the Auto Connect box 
6. Select the file “C:\Experiments\PoodleJump\Client\Client.exe” 
a. Replace leading dots with “C:\Experiments” 
7. Open “C:\Experiments\PoodleJump\Server\Server.exe” on computer 24 
8. Hit “Load Settings” button and select 
“C:\Experiments\PoodleJump\Server\ExperimentSettings\Low.txt” 
9. As participants arrive, mark them as “participated” on http://experiments.econ.sfu.ca/ 
10. Set the number of participants in both ESI and Server 
11. Give consent forms and receipts and instruct participants to fill out everything except the 
payment amount 
12. Take in consent forms 
13. Give the pre-experiment speech 
a. Eyes on own screen 
b. Don’t communicate with other participants 
c. Raise hand to ask question 
d. No food 
e. Keep drinks in closed containers 
f. Cell phones away 
g. If doing paid quiz, explain about the paid quiz 
14. Click the big green check mark in ESI to launch the program 
15. Instruct subjects to click “Run” 
16. Tell participants to sit quietly once they have finished instructions 
17. (if doing quiz) Tell them about quiz (and incentives if quiz is incentivized) 
18. Click “Begin Instructions” 
19. Allow them to go through the instructions 
20. (if doing quiz) Hand out quiz 
21. (if doing quiz) Take in quiz 
22. (if doing quiz + answers) Read quiz answers 
23. Click start button 
24. (if doing quiz) Grade quiz during the experiment 
25. Mark experiment as “Finished” on http://experiments.econ.sfu.ca/ 
26. When experiment is complete, ask students to wait at their computers and have their receipts 
ready 
27. Call students by computer number and pay them $7+their experiment payoff, filling out dollar 
amounts in each receipt 
28. Move data files from “..\PoodleJump\Server\Server_Data\” into 
“Dropbox\PoodleJump\data\[appropriate folder]\” 
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We include copies of all instructions pages as seen by each subject in all treatments.
First, we show the screenshots that apply for all except for the ENHANCED treatment.
Note that the printed instructions for the paper treatment did not include the screenshots
shown in Figure B.4 and Figure B.6, since they completed practice periods for Tasks 1 and
2 as part of the on-screen instructions, like all other subjects.
Figure B.2: Instructions page 1: introduction to the experiment
Figure B.3: Instructions page 2: description of Task 1
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Figure B.4: Instructions page 3: Task 1 practice
Figure B.5: Instructions page 4: description of Task 2
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Figure B.6: Instructions page 5: Task 2 practice
12
Figure B.7: Instructions page 6: payment schedule description
13
Figure B.8: Instructions page 7: summary
Next, we include screenshots from the instructions from the ENHANCED treatment.
Note that, unlike in the other treatments, the final summary screen remained displayed in
the ENHANCED while subjects wrote the quiz.
Figure B.9: ENHANCED Instructions page 1: introduction to the experiment
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Figure B.10: ENHANCED Instructions page 2: overview and payment
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Figure B.11: ENHANCED Instructions page 3: payment examples
16
Figure B.12: ENHANCED Instructions page 4: description of Task 1
Figure B.13: ENHANCED Instructions page 5: Task 1 practice
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Figure B.14: ENHANCED Instructions page 6: description of Task 2
Figure B.15: ENHANCED Instructions page 7: Task 2 practice
18
Figure B.16: ENHANCED Instructions page 8: payment recap
19
Figure B.17: ENHANCED Instructions page 7: summary
20
Our quiz, which was included after the instructions and before the main experiment in
all treatments except for NO QUIZ, featured the following six questions:
Figure B.18: Post-instructions quiz
In our follow-up experimental sessions, we slightly re-worded some of the quiz questions
to make them more clear. This new quiz was administered to all subjects in the ENHANCED
treatment and some of the subjects in the QUIZ treatment.
Figure B.19: Revised post-instructions quiz
While scores in the QUIZ treatment did increase slightly under the new quiz, from an
average of 3.9 to 4.4, this difference is not statistically significant (p = .11, rank-sum test),
and thus we pool data from all QUIZ sessions. We also did not observe any significant
differences in NMB (p = .50, Fisher’s exact test).
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C Robustness checks
We redo our analysis with three alternative measures of NMB to check the robustness our
results. The specifications reported in Table C.1-3 are all analogous to the specifications in
Table 4, but with alternative definitions of NMB. The dependent variable “NMB1” is equal
to one if the subject did Task 2 before period 21 and equal to zero otherwise; this measure
of NMB allows for trembles. The “NMB2” variable defines any behavioral deviation from
optimality as NMB. That is, it classifies a subject as exhibiting NMB unless they did Task
2 exactly in period 22. Finally, the “NMB3” variable classifies those who did Task 2 before
period 22 or never at all as NMB. The results of these alternative specifications are broadly
consistent with those reported in Table 4. Figure C.1 plots the share of subjects with
NMB in each treatment, by each of these alternative measures. To check the robustness
of our logit regressions, Table C.4 reports estimated linear probability models with (OLS
analogues to columns 1 and 2 of Table 4); for comparison purposes note that we do not
report marginal effects in Table 4 since the mediation analysis in column 4 provides the
economically meaningful estimates of interest.



















NO QUIZ QUIZ ANSWERS INCENTIVE TWICE PAPER ENHANCED
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Table C.1: Treatment effects on NMB1 and Quiz Scores
Dependent variable Mediation analysis
NMB1 Quiz Score NMB1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
NO QUIZ -0.301 n
(-1.096, 0.495)
ANSWERS -0.825* 0.207 -0.050 -0.169*
112(-1.746, 0.096) (-2.648, 3.061) (-0.586, 0.487) (-0.329, 0.008)ANSWERS ⇥ Quiz Score -0.324 0.005
(-1.062, 0.413) (-0.056, 0.070)
INCENTIVE -0.894* -1.380 0.211 -0.164*
114(-1.810, 0.022) (-4.202, 1.422) (-0.354, 0.775) (-0.331, 0.021)INCENTIVE ⇥ Quiz Score 0.127 -0.022
(-0.508, 0.762) (-0.091, 0.039)
TWICE -1.247** -0.677 0.421 -0.199**
114(-2.244, -0.249) (-3.940, 2.586) (-0.156, 0.998) (-0.367, -0.010)TWICE ⇥ Quiz Score -0.135 -0.044
(-0.847, 0.578) (-0.119, 0.016)
PAPER -1.123** 7.787** 1.320*** 0.163
116(-2.070, -0.176) (1.053, 14.521) (0.922, 1.718) (-0.118, 0.375)PAPER ⇥ Quiz Score -1.632** -0.133***
(-2.901, -0.363) (-0.223, -0.046)
ENHANCED -1.028** 0.249 0.489* -0.139*
113(-1.981, -0.074) (-3.675, 4.174) (-0.030, 1.008) (-0.325, 0.060)ENHANCED ⇥ Quiz Score -0.273 -0.051*
(-1.144, 0.598) (-0.123, 0.003)
Quiz Score -0.519***
(-0.875, -0.164)
Intercept -0.427* 1.662** 4.105***
(-0.893, 0.038) (0.121, 3.202) (3.789, 4.422)
Observations 308 265 265
QUIZ is the omitted category. *, **, and *** respectively denote p < .1, p < .05, p < .01. Robust (HC1) 95%
confidence intervals are in parentheses in Columns (1)-(4). Mediation column reports estimated “direct effects” in
the row of a treatment dummy, and mediated effects in the row of the interaction term between Quiz Score and that
treatment dummy, both evaluated relative to the QUIZ baseline. That is, the direct effect of a treatment corresponds
to E[NMB|Treatment,Quiz Score = 4.1]  E[NMB|QUIZ,Quiz Score = 4.1], while the mediated effect
corresponds to E[NMB|QUIZ,Quiz Score = E[Quiz Score|Treatment]]  E[NMB|QUIZ,Quiz Score = 4.1].
23
Table C.2: Treatment effects on NMB2 and Quiz Scores
Dependent variable Mediation analysis
NMB2 Quiz Score NMB2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
NO QUIZ -0.044 n
(-0.812, 0.724)
ANSWERS -0.373 -1.477 -0.050 -0.103
112(-1.179, 0.434) (-5.163, 2.209) (-0.586, 0.487) (-0.268, 0.070)ANSWERS ⇥ Quiz Score 0.192 0.009
(-0.624, 1.009) (-0.098, 0.116)
INCENTIVE -0.800* -2.840 0.211 -0.164*
114(-1.605, 0.004) (-6.591, 0.911) (-0.354, 0.775) (-0.344, 0.013)INCENTIVE ⇥ Quiz Score 0.443 -0.042
(-0.353, 1.239) (-0.157, 0.069)
TWICE -1.402*** -2.201 0.421 -0.254***
114(-2.267, -0.538) (-6.525, 2.122) (-0.156, 0.998) (-0.424, -0.078)TWICE ⇥ Quiz Score 0.130 -0.084
(-0.879, 1.138) (-0.203, 0.031)
PAPER -1.471*** 8.269 1.320*** 0.056
116(-2.331, -0.612) (-4.351, 20.889) (0.922, 1.718) (-0.288, 0.236)PAPER ⇥ Quiz Score -1.652 -0.284***
(-4.001, 0.698) (-0.389, -0.182)
ENHANCED -1.233*** -2.724 0.489* -0.216**
113(-2.083, -0.383) (-6.883, 1.434) (-0.030, 1.008) (-0.402, -0.033)ENHANCED ⇥ Quiz Score 0.345 -0.101*
(-0.560, 1.249) (-0.212, 0.007)
Quiz Score -1.344***
(-1.872, -0.816)
Intercept 0.373 6.236*** 4.105***
(-0.090, 0.835) (3.637, 8.836) (3.789, 4.422)
Observations 308 265 265
QUIZ is the omitted category. *, **, and *** respectively denote p < .1, p < .05, p < .01. Robust (HC1) 95%
confidence intervals are in parentheses in Columns (1)-(4). Mediation column reports estimated “direct effects” in
the row of a treatment dummy, and mediated effects in the row of the interaction term between Quiz Score and that
treatment dummy, both evaluated relative to the QUIZ baseline. That is, the direct effect of a treatment corresponds
to E[NMB|Treatment,Quiz Score = 4.1]  E[NMB|QUIZ,Quiz Score = 4.1], while the mediated effect
corresponds to E[NMB|QUIZ,Quiz Score = E[Quiz Score|Treatment]]  E[NMB|QUIZ,Quiz Score = 4.1].
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Table C.3: Treatment effects on NMB3 and Quiz Scores
Dependent variable Mediation analysis
NMB3 Quiz Score NMB3
(1) (2) (3) (4)
NO QUIZ 0.223 n
(-0.540, 0.987)
ANSWERS -0.442 -0.360 -0.050 -0.112
112(-1.252, 0.369) (-3.559, 2.839) (-0.586, 0.487) (-0.278, 0.070)ANSWERS ⇥ Quiz Score -0.075 0.009
(-0.851, 0.702) (-0.089, 0.106)
INCENTIVE -0.759* -2.207 0.211 -0.157*
114(-1.810, 0.022) (-5.334, 0.921) (-0.354, 0.775) (-0.336, 0.028)INCENTIVE ⇥ Quiz Score 0.127 -0.037
(-0.508, 0.762) (-0.141, 0.063)
TWICE -1.135*** -0.365 0.421 -0.183**
114(-1.996, -0.274) (-4.401, 3.670) (-0.156, 0.998) (-0.356, -0.004)TWICE ⇥ Quiz Score -0.193 -0.074
(-1.163, 0.776) (-0.181, 0.026)
PAPER -1.342*** 5.617 1.320*** 0.074
116(-2.220, -0.464) (-2.618, 13.852) (0.922, 1.718) (-0.252, 0.278)PAPER ⇥ Quiz Score -1.143 -0.240***
(-2.649, -0.363) (-0.340, -0.143)
ENHANCED -1.099** 0.321 0.489* -0.158*
113(-1.962, -0.235) (-3.790, 4.431) (-0.030, 1.008) (-0.349, 0.028)ENHANCED ⇥ Quiz Score -0.314 -0.088*
(-1.201, 0.574) (-0.189, 0.006)
Quiz Score -1.021***
(-1.471, -0.571)
Intercept 0.105 4.400*** 4.105***
(-0.350, 0.561) (2.314, 6.486) (3.789, 4.422)
Observations 308 265 265
QUIZ is the omitted category. *, **, and *** respectively denote p < .1, p < .05, p < .01. Robust (HC1) 95%
confidence intervals are in parentheses in Columns (1)-(4). Mediation column reports estimated “direct effects” in
the row of a treatment dummy, and mediated effects in the row of the interaction term between Quiz Score and that
treatment dummy, both evaluated relative to the QUIZ baseline. That is, the direct effect of a treatment corresponds
to E[NMB|Treatment,Quiz Score = 4.1]  E[NMB|QUIZ,Quiz Score = 4.1], while the mediated effect
corresponds to E[NMB|QUIZ,Quiz Score = E[Quiz Score|Treatment]]  E[NMB|QUIZ,Quiz Score = 4.1].
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Table C.4: Treatment effects on NMB – linear probability model robustness checks
Dependent variable
NMB1 NMB2 NMB3
NO QUIZ -0.069 -0.011 0.055
(0.092) (0.095) (0.096)
ANSWERS -0.173* -0.098 -0.092 -0.098 -0.110 -0.056
(0.090) (0.289) (0.102) (0.156) (0.101) (0.183)
INCENTIVE -0.184** -0.366 -0.197** -0.316 -0.184* -0.374
(0.088) (0.294) (0.098) (0.203) (0.097) (0.234)
TWICE -0.237*** -0.283 -0.329 *** -0.378* -0.263*** -0.242
(0.082) (0.303) (0.092) (0.194) (0.093) (0.205)
PAPER -0.220 *** 0.893* -0.342*** 0.911** -0.301*** 0.697
(0.083) (0.454) (0.090) (0.409) (0.088) (0.460)
ENHANCED -0.206** -0.126 -0.295*** -0.330 -0.256*** -0.111
(0.086) (0.347) (0.095) (0.254) (0.094) (0.250)
Quiz Score -0.117*** -0.209*** -0.192***
(0.035) (0.022) (0.026)
ANSWERS ⇥ Quiz Score -0.020 -0.001 -0.016
(0.060) (0.040) (0.043)
INCENTIVE ⇥ Quiz Score 0.048 0.038 0.053
(0.059) (0.042) (0.048)
TWICE ⇥ Quiz Score 0.021 0.030 0.013
(0.058) (0.039) (0.041)
PAPER ⇥ Quiz Score -0.177** -0.180** -0.137*
(0.079) (0.069) (0.078)
ENHANCED ⇥ Quiz Score -0.005 0.030 -0.011
(0.067) (0.050) (0.046)
Intercept 0.395*** 0.873*** 0.592*** 1.450*** 0.526*** 1.313***
(0.057) (0.166) (0.057) (0.090) (0.058) (0.113)
Observations 308 265 308 265 308 265
R2 0.044 0.194 0.082 0.387 0.072 0.340
QUIZ is the omitted category. *, **, and *** respectively denote p < 0.1, p < .05, p < .01.
Robust (HC1) standard errors are in parentheses.
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We note that our statistical tests find significant differences between our main QUIZ
treatment and each of our INCENTIVE, TWICE, PAPER, and ENHANCED treatments,
but do not detect significant differences among the latter four treatments, and also detects
no significant difference between the ANSWERS treatment and other treatments (see Ta-
ble 2 in the main text). This raises the question of statistical power. We note that the
comparisons between the QUIZ treatment and each of the INCENTIVE, TWICE, PAPER,
and ENHANCED treatments appear to be appropriately powered. Across the latter four
treatments, 21.6% of subject misunderstand (a fraction which ranges between 18.4-23.7%
across these treatments),1 while 47.4% of subjects in the QUIZ treatment misunderstand. A
simple ex-post power calculation indicates that if we recruited n1 = 76 and n2 = 38 subjects
to two treatments in which each subject misunderstands with probability p1 = .474 and
p2 = .216 (respectively), then we have a 79.4% chance of detecting a statistically significant
difference between treatments (at the 5% significance level). This suggests a reasonable
level of power in our comparisons between the four aformentioned treatments and QUIZ.
However, 33.3% of subject misunderstand in the ANSWERS treatment – an intermediate
case between QUIZ and these other four treatments. If we recruited n1 = 76 and n2 = 36
subjects to two treatments in which each subject misunderstands with probability p1 = .474
and p2 = .333 (respectively), then we have only a 33.2% chance of detecting a statistically
significant difference between treatments. If instead we recruited n1 = 38 and n2 = 36
subjects to two treatments in which each subject misunderstands with probability p1 = .216
and p2 = .333 (respectively), then we have only a 18.2% chance of detecting a statistically
significant difference between treatments. These calculations indicate that our sample sizes
are too small to reliably detect a statistically significant difference between our ANSWERS
treatment and the QUIZ treatment, or between the ANSWERS treatment and any of the
INCENTIVE, TWICE, PAPER, and ENHANCED treatments. If we instead view the NO
QUIZ and QUIZ, pooled, as baseline instructions treatments without reinforcement, and
1These numbers are relatively close to each other, so we use the 21.6% for our illustrative calculations
below.
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the remaining treatments as enhanced instructions or reinforcement treatments, then our
samples have n1 = 119, n2 = 189, p1 = .462, and p2 = .238; under these samples sizes and
NMB probabilities, we had a 98.3% chance of detecting a significant difference in NMB.
Our statistical analysis was conducted in R (R Core Team, 2017). The regressions in Table
3 (and above) used the ’lm’ and ’glm’ command in the base ’stats’ package, with robust
standard errors calculated using the ’sandwich’ package (Zeileis 2004; 2006). Mediation
analysis used the ’mediation’ package (Tingley et al., 2014). Goodman-Kruskal gamma tests
use the ’DescTools’ package (Signorell, 2018). We used the ‘pwr’ package (Champely, 2018)
for the power analysis reported above. Figures made in ’ggplot2’ (Wickham, 2009).
D Post-experiment questionnaire
At suggestion of a referee and the editor, we added a post-experiment questionnaire to our
ENHANCED treatment, and ran additional sessions of the QUIZ treatment followed by this
questionnaire to paint a more complete picture of subjects’ decisionmaking processes as they
went though the experiment. We asked nine questions in total.
Our first observation is that there is no statistical difference between QUIZ and EN-
HANCED on any of the first six quantitative questions.
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Q1.  Please think back to when you read the instructions and rate how much you agree with the 
following three statements on a scale of 1 to 7: 
 
 
i. The instructions were clear. 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Strongly         Neither      Strongly 
Disagree         Agree nor     Agree 




ii. I understood the best time to switch to task 2 (the slider task) – that is, when to switch in 
order to get the highest payment. 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Strongly         Neither      Strongly 
Disagree         Agree nor     Agree 




iii. I understood that I could only complete task 2 once. 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Strongly         Neither      Strongly 
Disagree         Agree nor     Agree 






Figure C.3: Post-experiment questionnaire (Page 2)
Q2. Please think back to when the experiment was underway and rate how much you agree 
with the following three statements on a scale of 1 to 7: 
 
 
i. My main goal in the experiment was to maximize my earnings. 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Strongly         Neither      Strongly 
Disagree         Agree nor     Agree 




ii. I remembered the best time to switch to task 2. 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Strongly         Neither      Strongly 
Disagree         Agree nor     Agree 




iii. I remembered that I could only complete task 2 once. 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Strongly         Neither      Strongly 
Disagree         Agree nor     Agree 






Figure C.4: Post-experiment questionnaire (Page 3)



































Q1i (Clarity) 5.7 (6) 5.4 (6) 0.31
Q1ii (Understood Optimum) 5.7 (7) 5.6 (7) 0.41
Q1iii (Understood Once) 5.4 (7) 5.9 (7) 0.55
Retention
Q2i (Maximized Earnings) 6.4 (7) 6.3 (7) 0.43
Q2ii (Remembered Optimum) 5.8 (7) 5.6 (6) 0.57
Q2iii (Remembered Once) 5.6 (7) 6.0 (7) 0.38
Mean (median) reported; p-values for rank-sum tests of equality of distributions.
Table C.5: Correlation between subjects’ evaluation and misunderstanding and quiz score
misunderstanding p.value_misunderstanding quiz score p.value_score
Q1i -0.168 0.159 0.281 0.017
Q1ii -0.267 0.024 0.202 0.089
Q1iii -0.406 0.0004 0.202 0.088
Q2i 0.039 0.744 0.046 0.700
Q2ii -0.371 0.001 0.383 0.001
Q2iii -0.356 0.002 0.196 0.100
Table D.1 shows that our post-experimental questionnaire results indicate that subjects
largely felt that they both understood and retained the key pieces of information from the
instructions – with the median subject indicating that they agreed or strongly agreed that
they understood and remembered when they should switch (Q1ii, Q2ii), and how many times
they could switch (Q1iii, Q2iii). In addition, most subjects agreed with the statement “The
instructions were clear”, with the median subject rating the statement a 6 out of 7. We
find no significant differences between the distribution of answers to any of these questions
between the QUIZ and ENHANCED treatments (p > .3 in all pairwise comparisons, rank-
sum tests). Since we do observe a difference in NMB revealed in the experiment, our post-
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experimental questionnaire inadvertently reveals its limits at diagnosing reasons for NMB
and the potential for improvements. That being said, Table C.3 indicates that subjects’
post-experiment answers strongly correlate with both NMB in the experiment and quiz
scores. Post-experiment reports of understanding (Q1ii,iii) and retention (Q2ii,iii) were each
negatively correlated with NMB (p < .03 in all cases). In addition, the subject’s post-
experimental agreement with the statement “The instructions were clear” was positively
correlated with their post-instructions quiz score (⇢ = .281, p = .017).
22 of the 72 subjects who wrote the questionnaire mentioned the instructions in their
written answers. Nearly all of these were in Q5: “What advice would you give to a future
participant in this experiment?” For instance, the first three subjects to mention the in-
structions answered Q5 as follows: “Pay attention to the instructions.” “Do the experiment
with patience and read instructions very carefully.” “Read the instructions and follow them
for more $.” These are typical answers; many subjects recognized, ex post, that paying close
attention to the instructions was important for achieving the maximum payoff.
21 of the 72 subjects who wrote the questionnaire showed some kind of mistaken under-
standing of the experiment, even after having completed it. Many of these misunderstandings
were orthogonal to our variable of interest (the time to do task 2). For instance, although
our instructions clearly stated that one could get a $0.25 payoff for each period of task 1 if a
certain threshold was reached, many seemed to believe that one could earn more than $0.25
by doubling or tripling the threshold. For instance, one subject wrote, “You have a poodle
that jumps on to platforms, each 75 units, you get paid 25c.” Another one wrote, “Roughly,
I would only get 50c at most doing poodle jump for the whole period.” The payoff is fixed
at 25 cents, so 50 would be impossible. Many subjects appear to believe that they could
earn for both tasks 1 and 2 if they completed the minimum height before switching. This
is a minor misunderstanding, though it is stated in the instructions that one must forego
earnings from one period of task 1 in order to perform task 2.
However, the majority of subjects do not show explicit misunderstandings in their an-
33
swers, and some even demonstrate learning. One subject who did not perform task 2 at the
correct time wrote, “I wasn’t aware I can only switch to task 2 only once. So I switched to
task 2 in the first period.” Another wrote, “I thought it didn’t mention number of times we
could do the bonus so I did it very early on.” These subjects clearly realized their mistakes
after they had made them, which suggests that repeated decisions (with feedback of some
form) can be a substitute for reinforcing understanding. On the other hand, some subjects
failed to understand our instructions and still didn’t understand them afterwards. One such
subject wrote, “If you taking task 1, you can change game into task 2, but you cannot turn
back to task 1.”
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